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THE NURSE AS PATIENT ADVOCATE: IS THERE A
CONFLICT OF INTEREST?*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nursing has been widely acknowledged in the last generation as
an independent profession with its own body of knowledge and legal
accountability.' Contemporary nurses2 can be found managing the
care of gravely ill infants in state-of-the-art neonatal intensive care
units, functioning independently to ensure the health and safety of
workers in industrial facilities, and providing primary emergency re-
sponse to consumers in computerized poison control centers. The
common element in these diverse settings is the nurse's primary re-
sponsibility to her' patient. This responsibility, however, may in-
volve the duty to support her patient in a decision contrary to the
beliefs of the physician, institution or society as to what is "right."
The potential conflict between a nurse's ethical duty to her pa-
tient, and her legal duty to her employer and the physician, may
expose the nurse to considerable professional risk." "The strain on
nurse-physician relationships is increased greatly in settings such as
intensive care units, where nurses and physicians work in close con-
tact under extremely stressful conditions which frequently involve
ethical problems and dilemmas."5
© 1989 by Karen Markus
* The author would like to thank Professor Aidan R. Gough, Santa Clara University
School of Law, for his guidance in the area of medical law.
1. See generally G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, THE RIGHTS OF DOCTORS,
NURSES AND ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1981); THE LAW AND THE EXPANDING
NURSING ROLE (B. Bullough ed. 1980); Greenlaw, To Whom Is the Nurse Accountable?,
1980 NURSING L. & ETHICS 3; Morris, The Negligent Nurse-The Physician and the Hospi-
tal, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 109 (1981); Comment, A Revolution in White-New Approaches in
Treating Nurses as Professionals, 30 VAND. L. REV. 839 (1977).
2. The word "nurse" as used by the author refers to a registered nurse who is licensed
under state law to practice nursing.
3. Despite the fact that men have made important contributions to the profession of
nursing, 97% of all registered nurses in the United States are women. Westfall, Legal Staffing
Issues and the Nursing Shortage, 10 CAL. NURSING REV. 18-19 (1988). Therefore, for the
sake of brevity female pronouns will be used to refer to nurses.
4. Robinson, Patient Advocacy and the Nurse: Is There A Conflict of Interest?, 22
NURSING FORUM 58, 62 (1985).
5. L. CURTIN & M. FLAHERTY, NURSING ETHICS: THEORIES AND PRAGMATICS XI
(1982).
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There is little to guide nurses in resolving these dilemmas. The
law and standards of nursing practice are vague regarding patient
advocacy. There is a paucity of state law regarding rights to ethical
decision making for nurses.6 Nursing practice acts provide minimum
guidelines, but often do not adequately define unprofessional behav-
ior. Codes of ethics do not provide legal protection for the nurse
who acts as a patient advocate and are often too abstract to apply
with consistency.8
The lack of usable guidelines results in confusion among nurses
and attorneys over the types of behavior subject to sanction. Conduct
that has been sanctioned includes the granting of a patient's request
to discuss treatment alternatives,' reporting unsafe conditions to the
hospital's accrediting organization,' ° and refusing to perform kidney
dialysis for a terminal patient in order to avoid further complica-
tions." Sanctions commonly imposed on nurses include harassment,
demotion or discharge, and suspension or revocation of a license to
practice nursing.'
This comment surveys cases in which nurses have been chas-
tised for acting as patient advocates as mandated by professional
codes of ethics,'" hospital policies' 4 and state law.' The comment
"An intensive care service is a nursing unit in which there are specially trained nursing
and supportive personnel and diagnostic, monitoring and therapeutic equipment necessary to
provide specialized medical and nursing care to critically ill patients." CAL. ADMIN. CODE. tit.
22, § 70491 (1975).
6. Illinois Right of Conscience Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1h, para. 5302, § 2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1987), prohibits "all forms of discrimination, disqualification, coercion, disability
or imposition of liability upon such persons or entities by reason of their refusing to act con-
trary to their conscience or conscientious convictions in refusing to obtain, receive, accept or
deliver medical services and medical care." However, even Illinois, which offers the most com-
prehensive rights of this nature available to health care providers, has interpreted the Act to
refer only to personal moral or religious convictions, as opposed to ethical objections, to the
delivery of health care. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513
(1978); Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 593 P.2d 711 (1979).
8. G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ, & B. KATZ, supra note 1, at 23-24; Huckabay, Ethical-
Moral Issues in Nursing Practice and Decision Making, 1986 NURSING ADMIN. Q. 61, 65.
See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
9. Tuma, 100 Idaho 74, 593 P.2d 711 (1979).
10. Misericordia Hosp. Medical Center v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial Hosp., 199 N.J. Super. 18, 488
A.2d 229 (1985).
12. R. ANDERSON, AVOIDING MALPRACTICE FOR THE CALIFORNIA NURSE 86 (1982).
13. The nurse's respect for the worth and dignity of the individual human being
applies irrespective of the nature of the health problem. It is reflected in the care
given the person who is disabled as well as the normal; the patient with the
long-term illness as well as the one with the acute illness, or the recovering
patient as well as the one who is terminally ill or dying.
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discusses the various defenses used by nurses against charges of
wrongful behavior, as well as inconsistent judicial responses. Judicial
treatment of nursing advocacy is examined in the context of broad
historical trends in nursing as reflected in public opinion. Finally,
this comment suggests measures to eliminate some of the prevailing
confusion regarding rights and duties of patient advocacy so that
professional nurses can plan their conduct vis-a-vis patient advocacy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining Patient Advocacy
The duty of patient advocacy arises from the rights of the pa-
tient as described in A Patients' Bill of Rights promulgated by the
American Hospital Association, which provides that "activities must
be conducted with an overriding concern for the patient, and, above
all, the recognition of his dignity as a human being."1  Respect for
the dignity of the patient specifically extends to the right to refuse
medical care. 7 As of 1987, thirty-nine states had passed laws sup-
porting the patient's right to die."
The necessity for patient advocacy stems from the impact of ill-
ness on an individual's autonomy and ability to make decisions,
which places the caretaker in a powerful position. "[Tihe psycholog-
ical violence to which the person is subjected in the daily living expe-
rience as an institutionalized patient" creates a duty to assist patients
AMERICAN NURSES' ASSOCIATION CODE FOR NURSES 1.4 (1976) (with interpretive state-
ments) (contained in 4 ENCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1789, 1790 (W.T. Reich ed. 1978)) [here-
inafter A.N.A. CODE].
14. "The nurse must function as a patient advocate; that is, every decision by health
providers must be evaluated in terms of its effect on the patient." SANTA CLARA VALLEY
MEDICAL CENTER NURSING SERVICES PHILOSOPHY A-6302-01 (March 4, 1985). See also
1983 ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 118 (Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.8 (West 1982) (regarding health professionals' duty to
report patient abuse); Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195
(West Supp. 1989).
16. AM. HOSp. ASS'N, A PATIENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS (1973) (contained in 4 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1782, 1783 (W.T. Reich ed. 1978)) [hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS].
17. Id. at 1782.
18. The states that have passed right to die legislation, also known as living will laws,
are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. HANDBOOK OF LIVING
WILL LAWS 28-29 (1987).
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in coping with this environment.19 This duty may be implemented in
various ways depending on the particular needs of the individual
patient.
The nurse's obligation as an advocate has three basic compo-
nents: (1) to inform patients of their rights in a particular situation,
(2) to ensure that patients are given all the information necessary to
make an informed decision, and (3) to support patients in decisions
they make.2° The complexity of the medical environment requires a
comprehensive model of advocacy. The nurse must determine which
aspects of the model to utilize on a case-by-case basis.
The first aspect of the role of advocate is that of "counselor or
lay therapist" serving to comfort, reassure and provide companion-
ship."' The caring and consolation which are an integral part of
nursing have well recognized therapeutic effects.2" Another duty of
the advocate is to help the patient reach an informed decision. This
involves the exploration of therapeutic alternatives with the patient
in regard to the impact on his or her particular lifestyle.
A third responsibility is that of "watchdog" of the patients'
rights." The nurse is responsible for safeguarding her patient from
the incompetence of other health professionals. This may be a statu-
tory duty2' as well as an ethical one.25 A fourth component of the
advocacy model is that of spokesperson for patients who have diffi-
culty speaking for themselves. This duty is especially important in
the case of incompetent adults or children. Finally, the patient advo-
cate must ensure both the quality and continuity of care delivered to
19. ETHICAL ISSUES IN NURSING 18-19 (P.L. Chinn ed. 1986).
20. Kohnke, The Nurse as Advocate, 1980 AM. J. NURSING 2038, 2039.
21. Abrams, A Contrary View of the Nurse as Patient Advocate, 17 NURSING FORUM
258, 260 (1978).
22. "The interpretation of the environment is important on general medical/surgical
units. It is the sine qua non for the prevention of ICU psychosis or the onset of some of the
other deleterious emotional after-effects of ICU placement." Corless, Physicians and Nurses:
Roles and Responsibilities in Caring for the Critically Ill Patient, 10 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 72, 75 (1982); Sandroff, Is It Right? Protecting the M.D. or the Patient?, R.N. MAG.
28, 30 (Feb. 1981).
23. Abrams, supra note 21, at 261.
24. In 1986 Congress passed legislation to encourage good faith professional review ac-
tivities. It is designed to facilitate review, as well as reporting of questionable conduct among
doctors in response to the nationwide malpractice problem. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1987).
For examples of state medical malpractice reporting legislation, see also CAL. PENAL CODE §
11161.8 (West 1982); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
25. "The nurse acts to safeguard the client and the public when health care and safety
are affected by incompetent, unethical, or illegal practice of any person." A.N.A. CODE, supra
note 13, at 1792.
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the patient. 26 This duty arises from the nurse's role as continual ob-
server of the patient's condition in a fragmented health care system.2
B. Historical Trends in Nursing
1. Traditional Images of the Nurse
A review of major historical trends in the development of nurs-
ing illustrates the problems inherent in the role of the nurse as pa-
tient advocate. There are three traditional images that are inextrica-
bly linked to the status of women, and which continue to inhibit
public recognition of nursing as an independent professional disci-
pline. These images are of the nurse as mother, religious disciple and
unskilled servant.
a. Nurse As Mother
Since the skills of the nurse in her image as mother nurturing
her young were considered to be instinctive, their possession did not
elevate the status of the giver of such care. 2' The concept of the
"born nurse" has its origin in this image and was fostered by the
medical profession for many years, partly in response to the per-
ceived threat of encroachment by trained nurses on territory "belong-
ing" to physicians. 9 The importance of "womanly" qualities in a
nurse was commonly used to buttress the argument that nurses
needed little, if any, education." Since the American Medical Asso-
26. Abrams, supra note 21, at 261-62.
27. Corless, supra note 22, at 75.
28. L. CURTIN & M. FLAHERTY, supra note 5, at 68.
29. In a 1909 meeting organized by physicians to discuss the proper role of nurses, Dr.
Henry Beates, president of the Pennsylvania State Board of Medical Examiners declared, "the
instruction commonly prevalent in hospital training schools is not only absurdly too compre-
hensive, but dangerous. It is sufficient to almost entirely result in nurses assuming the right to
usurp the functions of physicians." J. ASHLEY, HOSPITALS, PATERNALISM AND THE ROLE OF
THE NURSE 80 (1976) (quoting BEATES, THE STATUS OF NURSES: A SOCIOLOGIC PROBLEM
6 (1909)).
This statement was made during a period in which the primary purpose of nursing train-
ing programs was to provide a free labor pool to hospitals. Theoretical learning was secondary.
In 1896 Mary Adeliade Nutting, a nurse leader, deplored the fact that student nurses com-
monly worked 60 to 105 hours per week in exchange for their education. Id. at 35. "As late as
1933 the administrator of the Massachusetts General Hospital of Boston admitted that the
monetary value of student nurse service in his hospital was the main reason for maintaining a
school." Id at 29.
30. "As a rule, women make the best nurses, or rather more of them have a natural
aptitude for the work. . . . [T]he main supply of nurses must be from the ranks of women."
Ingles, The Physicians' View of the Evolving Nursing Profession 1873-1913, 15 NURSING
FORUM 123, 127 (1976) (quoting 15 BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 610 (June 11, 1874)).
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ciation pronounced itself the sole authority on the scope of nursing
practice,"1 this attitude had a profound effect on both public opinion
and the education of nurses in this country.
One result has been inconsistency in nursing education. Nurses
in all fifty states can qualify to take licensing examinations via any
of three routes: a two year associate degree, a three year hospital
diploma, or a four or five year baccalaureate degree. 2 A baccalaure-
ate degree has been proposed as the minimum requirement for licen-
sure as a registered nurse by several state and national nursing orga-
nizations on the premise that a university degree is appropriate to
provide the level of expertise necessary to function as a registered
nurse and would bring order to a fragmented system of nursing
education.3"
However, even baccalaureate nursing education seldom provides
adequate instruction in ethics. Studies in the late 1970's reported
that the majority of accredited universities offering nursing degrees
"ignored, only slightly touched upon or haphazardly included" ethics
in their curricula. 3 ' Until the importance of the study of ethics is
recognized, nurses will be forced to continue to make decisions with-
out an adequate theoretical foundation. This results in difficulty in
defending their ethical decisions.
b. Nurse As Religious Disciple
The second anachronistic image of the nurse, originating in the
Middle Ages, is that of a religious disciple who cared for the sick as
31. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
32. Bullough, The Current Phase in the Development of Nurse Practice Acts, 28 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 365, 389 (1984).
33. Id. at 390. "The proposal to require a baccalaureate degree for a license as a regis-
tered nurse has divided nursing as has no other issue." Greenlaw, Definition and Regulation
of Nursing Practice: An Historical Survey, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 117, 120
(1985). The trend favoring the baccalaureate degree as the minimum requirement for state
licensure was elevated to the level of a national debate in 1974 when the New York State
Nurses' Association became the first to pass a resolution requiring a baccalaureate degree as
the minimum educational preparation for a state license as a registered nurse. Subsequently, at
least 47 state nursing organizations and several national nursing organizations, including the
American Nurses' Association, passed similar resolutions. Bullough, supra note 32, at 389.
Since most nurses lack a university degree, there is strong and concerted opposition by
nurses who feel their professional status and livelihood will be threatened by such a change. In
addition, organizations such as the American Hospital Association will probably oppose any
legislation to require a baccalaureate degree. Bullough, supra note 32, at 390. Furthermore,
many nursing educators think the benefits of standardizing nursing education are outweighed
by the potential disruption to the profession. Bullough, supra note 32, at 390. Therefore,
legislation to support the baccalaureate requirement is unlikely to succeed in the near future.
34. ETHICAL ISSUES IN NURSING, supra note 19, at 29.
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a means to salvation. Although viewed as an honorable vocation, the
goal of this behavior was antithetical to a view of nursing as a pro-
fession worthy of remuneration." Florence Nightingale perpetuated
this image by her concept of nursing as a monastic discipline involv-
ing "long hours of devoted work, and a measure of isolation from the
mainstream of society as even living arrangements for nurses con-
sisted of tightly controlled residences." ' In spite of Nightingale's ef-
forts to gain respectability for nursing, in the minds of many it re-
mained a calling, rather than a profession, suitable only for women
faced with the prospect of spinsterhood."
c. Nurse As Servant
The third historical image, the nurse as servant, evolved be-
tween the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries as nursing entered its
"Dark Ages." It was during this period that women, unmotivated by
the religious fervor of their predecessors, entered nursing primarily
as a last resort.3 8 Many were indigent illiterates or criminals who
exploited and abused patients. Since they were generally regarded as
unskilled labor, nursing was at its nadir as a profession. 9
2. Development of Divided Loyalties
Nursing entered its modern phase during the Victorian era
when the prevailing philosophy of female virtue stressed obedience to
the male.40 The emphasis on blind loyalty to the doctor extended
even to lying to the patient if so ordered.' The persistence of this
attitude is demonstrated by the 1950 American Nurses' Association
Code for Nurses, which stated that the nurse's obligation was to
carry out the doctor's orders and protect his reputation. 2
Although the American Nurses' Association has since changed
35. L. CURTIN & M. FLAHERTY, supra note 5, at 68.
36. L. CURTIN & M. FLAHERTY, supra note 5, at 68.
37. "A fundamental error obtains in attempting to designate the occupation of a nurse
as a profession. . . . The work of a nurse is an honorable 'calling' or vocation, and nothing
further." Ingles, The Physicians' View of the Evolving Nursing Profession 1873-1913, 15
NURSING FORUM 123, 147 (1976) (quoting Thompson, The Over-Trained Nurse, 83 N.Y.
MED. J. 851 (April 28, 1906)); B. EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH, WITCHES, MIDWIVES AND
NURSES: A HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS 35 (1973).
38. L. CURTIN & M. FLAHERTY, supra note 5, at 69.
39. P. KALISCH & B. KALISCH, THE ADVANCE OF AMERICAN NURSING 28 (1978).
40. J. ASHLEY, supra note 29, at 75-76.
41. L. CURTIN & M. FLAHERTY, supra note 5, at 80.
42. ETHICAL ISSUES IN NURSING, supra note 19, at 72.
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its primary directive to loyalty to the patient,4 attitudes of obedience
continue to pervade the profession. As recently as the late 1970's, a
study of the moral reasoning of nurses found that many of them still
operated at a traditional level that stressed "obedience to authority
and the need for maintaining harmonious relationships with institu-
tions and authority figures 'even when patients' rights were being
violated.' ""
The structure of early formal nursing education also contrib-
uted to unquestioning institutional loyalty. Most nursing schools
were hospital based. In an era of limited geographical mobility, this
resulted in nurses identifying with their training institutions rather
than with other nurses as members of a profession.' 5
In addition, hospital schools were typically controlled by physi-
cians who methodically quashed the development of nurses' indepen-
dent judgment. In 1906, the Journal of the American Medical Asso-
ciation stated that "[e]very attempt at initiative on the part of nurses
• , * should be reproved by the physician and by the hospital admin-
istration. . . .The professional instruction of nurses should be en-
trusted exclusively to the physician, who only can judge what is nec-
essary for them to know."'
Although doctors no longer control nursing education, most
nurses do not function as independent practitioners. They implement
the orders of physicians and function as employees within the bu-
reaucratic structure of an institution,' yet they are taught that their
primary responsibility is to the patient. The adoption of these diver-
gent loyalties can lead to fundamental conflicts. The nurse who is
ordered by a physician to perform an act that she believes is unethi-
cal, illegal or detrimental to the patient faces a difficult personal and
professional dilemma.'"
43. A.N.A. CODE, supra note 13, at 1790.
44. ETHICAL ISSUES IN NURSING, supra note 19, at 72 (citing C.P. MURPHY, THE
MORAL SITUATION IN NURSING 315 (no date given)).
45. Comment, supra note 1, at 841.
46. J. ASHLEY, supra note 29, at 77-78 (quoting Nurses Schools and Illegal Practice of
Medicine, 47 AM. MED. ASS'N 1835 (1906)).
47. In 1980 approximately 78% of all nurses practiced in institutions as employees.
Smith & Davis, Ethical Dilemmas: Conflicts Among Rights, Duties, and Obligations, 1980
AM. J. OF NURSING 1463.
48. For instance, in Barber v. Superior Court, a case in which two doctors were initially
indicted for murder, nurses were forbidden to provide intravenous fluids as a comfort measure
to a comatose patient. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). The nursing super-
visor who protested this allegedly inhumane treatment was unable to resolve the resulting
conflicts within the hospital system and resigned in order to file a complaint with the county
health department. "Even today, I still don't know what a nurse should do when following a
[Vol. 29
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C. Judicial Treatment of Patient Advocacy
As a result of the public image of nurses, "[h]istorically, there
has been considerable confusion in the courts regarding the nature of
a nurse's liability." '49 Until recently, judges have been reluctant to
hold nurses to a standard of care comparable to that of other profes-
sionals. The standard of care of the ordinary citizen was considered
appropriate to evaluate any alleged negligence of a nurse.50 Nurses
could not be found guilty of malpractice, which is defined as
"[p]rofessional misconduct." 51 To the extent that nurses are not re-
garded as professionals, their ethical decisions have not been ac-
corded legal merit by judges. The result of this attitude is that the
sanctions applied to nurses who make ethical decisions have been
largely upheld by the courts.
The cases discussed below uniformly involve institutional repri-
sals for. good faith attempts by health professionals, primarily nurses,
to act in the best interests of their patients. The various plaintiffs
sought relief via a number of legal theories with notable lack of
success.
1. Public Policy Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will
Doctrine in Wrongful Termination Cases
The most common legal claim made by the health professionals
sanctioned in these cases was in tort for wrongful discharge. Since
doctor's orders goes against her conscience and perhaps puts her in legal jeopardy, yet refusing
to follow them amounts to professional suicide." Smith, Zero Intake, NURSINGLIFE 18, 25
(Nov./Dec. 1983).
49. Comment, Nurses' Legal Dilemma: When Hospital Staffing Compromises Profes-
sional Standards, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 122 (1983).
50. See, e.g., Kambas v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hosp., 389 Mich. 249, 205 N.W.2d 431
(1973); Note, Nurse Malpractice in North Carolina: The Standard of Care, 65 N.C.L. REV.
579, 583 (1987).
51. BLACK'S LAW DIC'TIONARY 864 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). This meant that
nurses were subject to different procedural rules as well, such as applicable statutes of limita-
tions and the need for expert witnesses. "When an action against a nurse is based on negli-
gence, as distinguished from malpractice, expert testimony is generally held unnecessary in
order to establish the standard for judging the defendant." Morris, supra note 1, at 111.
The view of nursing as a profession dependent on physicians has also led to the use of
doctors as expert witnesses in jurisdictions where nurses are held to a professional standard of
care. However, a doctor's erroneous opinion regarding appropriate professional conduct for
nurses may lead to inequitable decisions by courts which do not understand that the nurse's
role is not encompassed by the physician's. "[Niot only do physicians no longer have the spe-
cial knowledge required to testify in all cases of nursing malpractice, but their use as experts
may create problems that could be avoided by using nurses as experts in most nursing mal-
practice cases." Note, supra note 50, at 590 (citing Comment, The Use of Nurses As Expert
Witnesses, 19 Hous. L. REV. 555, 571 n.113 (1982)).
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most of the health professionals were not covered by employment
contracts, their claims entailed creative attempts to carve public pol-
icy exceptions from the traditional employment-at-will doctrine,
which allows termination of employment by either party without
cause. 2 The plaintiffs sought to convince the courts that their con-
duct was supported by important public concerns, such as patient
welfare and safety. They argued that public policy warranted
preventing their employers from discharging them in retaliation for
professional decisions made in the best interests of their patients. Ju-
dicial acceptance of a public policy defense against wrongful dis-
charge has depended primarily upon whether the source of the pub-
lic policy supporting the plaintiff's behavior is statutory or non-
statutory.
a. Nonstatutory Sources of Public Policy
Courts have been unwilling to accord public policy status to
nonstatutory sources of policy such as professional oaths and codes of
ethics." In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 4 Dr. Pierce, a
research physician, was allegedly forced to resign in response to her
refusal to work on the development of a drug she felt was hazardous
to the public. She argued that continuing work on the drug would
violate her vow to do no harm as a medical doctor under the Hippo-
cratic oath, and urged the New Jersey Supreme Court to recognize
this proscription as public policy, thereby giving rise to a cause of
action for wrongful discharge.""
While acknowledging the trend toward more liberal public pol-
icy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, the court ruled
that the general language of the Hippocratic oath fell short of the
standard required for judicial elevation to the level of public policy."
The court stated that an employee has a cause of action for wrongful
discharge only when the discharge is contrary to a "clear mandate"
of public policy.57 However, the court tempered the pronouncement
52. "Generally a contract of employment for an indefinite term is a 'contract at will' and
may be terminated by either party, whereas a contract for a definite term may not be termi-
nated before the end of the term, except for cause or by mutual agreement .... Joshua v.
McBride, 19 Ark. App. 31, 34, 716 S.W.2d 215, 217 (1986) (citing Griffin v. Erickson, 277
Ark. 433, 436-37, 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982)).
53. Note, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At-Will
Rule, 64 N.C.L. REV. 840, 841 (1986).
54. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
55. Id. at 74, 417 A.2d at 513.
56. Id. at 76, 417 A.2d at 514.
57. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
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that a clear mandate emanates only from sources such as the legisla-
ture and administrative rules with the statement that "[i]n certain
instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of
public policy.""8 The burden of proof was placed on the employee to
identify a specific expression of public policy that the court would
scrutinize on a case-by-case basis.
The court criticized Dr. Pierce for failing to use a professional
code of ethics to buttress her ethical objections to the drug experi-
ments. It recognized that professional employees "owe a special duty
to abide not only by federal and state law, but also by the recognized
codes of ethics of their professions." 9 The broad reach of this state-
ment was limited, however, by the proviso that while this duty may
oblige them to decline to perform acts required by their employers, it
does not permit them to prevent their employers from pursuing their
business.60
The court admonished professional employees to distinguish
business decisions that offend their personal morals from violations
of their professional code of ethics. The court stated that if the objec-
tion is derived from personal moral beliefs, the employee must real-
ize that there is room for reasonable minds to differ."' However, the
court failed to identify a method by which this sometimes difficult
distinction can be applied.
In Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial Hospital,2 a
New Jersey appellate court declined to follow the Pierce court's rec-
ognition of codes of ethics as potential sources of public policy.
Plaintiff Corrine Warthen, a nurse specialist in kidney dialysis, was
assigned to dialyze a terminally ill double amputee patient in renal
failure. On two occasions she had to terminate the procedure because
the patient suffered cardiac arrest and severe internal hemorrhaging.
Warthen notified her supervisor in a timely manner of her
"moral, medical and philosophical objections" to performing a proce-
dure that further complicated a terminal patient's condition.68 When
Warthen refused to perform dialysis as ordered, she was fired.
Warthen attempted to use the American Nurses' Association
Code for Nurses to justify her behavior. The Code requires that the
nurse demonstrate respect for human dignity. It also provides that a
58. Id.
59. Id. at 71-72, 417 A.2d at 512.
60. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
61. Id. at 75, 417 A.2d at 514.
62. 199 N.J. Super. 18, 488 A.2d 229 (1985).
63. Id. at 21, 488 A.2d at 230.
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nurse who is "personally opposed to the delivery of care in a particu-
lar case because of the nature of the health problem or the proce-
dures to be used . . . is justified in refusing to participate.""' The
Code stipulates that the nurse must make her refusal known in time
for other arrangements to be made.65
The court acknowledged Warthen's good faith effort to comply
with her professional code of ethics, but held that the Code did not
provide the clear mandate required by Pierce because the passage on
which she relied defined "a standard of conduct beneficial only to the
individual nurse and not to the public at large.""
The court's decision was also based on a conflicting public pol-
icy recently recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court: patients'
right to expect that medical treatment will not be terminated against
their will.6 The court held that "[t]his basic policy mandate clearly
outweighs any policy favoring the right of a nurse to refuse to par-
ticipate in treatments which he or she personally believes threatens
human dignity."" The court also feared that it would be virtually
impossible to administer a hospital if nurses were allowed the free-
dom to make decisions not to treat patients based on their personal
beliefs.69
A central issue in the case was whether the decision regarding
public policy was a matter of fact that should have been resolved by
a jury or whether the trial court was correct in granting summary
judgment for the defendant. The court based its decision on Pierce,
in which the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the determina-
tion of whether a clear mandate of public policy exists must be made
on a case-by-case basis as a matter of law. The opinion analogized
the identification of a mandate of public policy to the court's duty to
interpret statutes or define duty in negligence cases."0
The court effectively closed the door on the use of professional
codes of ethics as public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine when it stated, "The source of public policy is the statutes
enacted by the legislature and in the decisions of the courts; there we
64. A.N.A. CODE, supra note 13, at 1790.
65. A.N.A. CODE, supra note 13, at 1790.
66. Warthen. 199 N.J. Super. at 27, 488 A.2d at 233. See infra notes 131-32 and
accompanying text.
67. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). Although the patient in
Warthen was comatose and his wishes in this regard unknown, the family wanted the dialysis
treatments to continue. Warthen, 199 N.J. Super. at 27, 488 A.2d at 233.
68. Id. at 27, 488 A.2d at 234.
69. Id. at 27-28, 488 A.2d at 234.
70. Id. at 23-25, 488 A.2d at 231-32.
[Vol. 29
NURSE AS ADVOCATE
find what acts are considered harmful to the public and therefore
unlawful."71
b. Statutory Sources of Public Policy
1) Nurse Practice Acts
"Courts have been more willing to limit the at-will rule when
the discharge contravenes an established public policy, particularly a
legislatively declared policy. '72 However, attempts by nurses to de-
rive public policy exceptions from existing legislative sources have
demonstrated their inadequacy. In Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical
Center,3 the plaintiff, head nurse of an intensive care unit, brought
suit for retaliatory discharge on the grounds that her termination vi-
olated a mandate of the Colorado Nurse Practice Act.
Lampe's responsibilities included implementing staffing for the
intensive care unit. Although Lampe was ordered to reduce overtime
expenditures, she felt she was unable to decrease the amount of over-
time worked without jeopardizing her patients and was fired for be-
ing "unwilling to fulfill the requirements of her job description. '77
Lampe relied on the legislative declaration of policy contained
in the Nurse Practice Act requiring a nurse to act in a manner con-
sistent with the health and safety of her patients.7 She contended
that had she obeyed the instructions of her employer to reduce over-
time, she would have violated the statute under which she was
licensed.
The court refused to allow the broad statement of policy con-
tained in the statute to impute a legislative intent to "modify the
contractual relationships between hospitals and their employees in
such situations."7" Thus, Lampe was denied a claim for relief due to
lack of prescriptive specificity in the statute governing her profes-
sional behavior.
In contrast, Tuma v. Board of Nursing77 demonstrated the pro-
scriptive inadequacy of a nurse practice act. Plaintiff Tuma, an in-
structor of clinical nursing, requested to be assigned to administer
chemotherapy to a patient with leukemia because of a special interest
71. Id. at 25, 488 A.2d at 232 (citing Schaffer v. Federal Trust Co., 132 N.J. Eq. 235,
240-41, 28 A.2d 75, 79 (1942)).
72. Note, supra note 53, at 850.
73. 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978).
74. Id. at 466, 590 P.2d at 514.
75. Id. at 467, 590 P.2d at 515.
76. Id. at 468, 590 P.2d at 515-16.
77. 100 Idaho 74, 593 P.2d 711 (1979).
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in the needs of dying patients. The patient "pleaded with Tuma to
return that evening to discuss an alternative treatment" to the chem-
otherapy. 8 Tuma discussed the possibility of laetrile and dietary
therapy with the patient, but the chemotherapy was continued and
the patient died two weeks later after experiencing serious adverse
side effects from the chemotherapy.
79
Although there were no allegations that Tuma had caused harm
to the patient, complaints were made to the Board of Nursing by
"[h]ospital personnel that Tuma had interfered with the physician-
patient relationship."8 A hearing officer concluded that Tuma's dis-
cussion of treatment alternatives with her patient constituted unpro-
fessional conduct in violation of the Idaho Nurse Practice Act.81 De-
spite the fact that the Nurse Practice Act stipulated that the policies
of the Board of Nursing conform to the policies and practices of the
American Nurses' Association, the hearing officer would not allow
Tuma to testify regarding her knowledge of the professional ethics
provisions contained in the American Nurses' Association Code for
Nurses.82 The Board of Nursing affirmed the hearing officer's deci-
sion and suspended Tuma's license for six months.8
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found nothing in the lan-
guage of the Nurse Practice Act to put Tuma on notice that her
license would be suspended if she engaged in the contemplated be-
havior.84 The court decried Tuma's deprivation of an important
property right in the absence of guidelines established by the Board
of Nursing, especially in view of the fact that the hearing officer did
not possess the expertise to determine whether Tuma's conduct was
unprofessional.85
Moreover, the Minimum Standards, Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Idaho Board of Nursing require nurses to
"[piromote, and participate in, patient education based on the indi-
vidual's health needs .... ,,.. The court pointed out that this man-
date actually supported Tuma's decision to discuss treatment alter-
natives with her patient. The court therefore held that the Board of
Nursing violated Tuma's due process rights by authorizing the sus-
78. Id. at 75, 593 P.2d at 712.
79. Id. at 76, 593 P.2d at 713.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 76-77, 593 P.2d at 713-14.
82. Id. at 80 n.2, 593 P.2d at 715 n.2.
83. Id. at 79, 593 P.2d at 714.
84. Id. at 82, 593 P.2d at 717.
85. Id. at 85, 593 P.2d at 720.
86. Id. at 83 n.3, 593 P.2d at 718 n.3.
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pension of her license on the grounds of unprofessional conduct
without a specific statutory definition of such conduct.87
2. Other Statutory Sources of Public Policy
Attempts to use statutes other than those pertaining directly to
nursing to support a public policy argument have also met with little
success. In Maus v. National Living Centers,88 plaintiff Maus, a
nursing assistant, was a long-term dedicated worker in a nursing
home. After the home was purchased by defendants, Maus felt that
conditions deteriorated to the detriment of the patients. In response
to her complaints to superiors that the patients were being neglected,
Maus was terminated from her job. Maus brought a wrongful dis-
charge action against her employer, citing a Texas statute that
makes the failure of nursing home owners or employees to report
neglect or abuse of patients a criminal misdemeanor.89 She argued
that tort law should be extended to allow the reporting statute to
create a public policy exception to the traditional employment-at-will
rule.
Recognizing that it stood "at the cross-roads of two important
public policies," the court nevertheless decided that the time had not
yet come to create a new right of recovery for wrongful discharge,
and deferred the decision to the state supreme court or legislature."0
Thus, health care providers in Maus' position are left with the di-
lemma of whether to commit a criminal violation in order to keep
their means of livelihood.
In another recent case, Free v. Holy Cross Hospital,"1 an Illi-
nois nurse utilized a unique statute' 2 in an unsuccessful attempt to
support her argument for a public policy- exception to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. Nurse Free was employed as a hospital shift
supervisor. She was ordered to transfer a patient who had been ar-
87. Id. at 82-83, 593 P.2d at 717.
88. 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
89. Id. at 675.
90. Id. at 676.
91. 153 I1. App. 3d 45, 505 N.E.2d 1188 (1985).
92. At least 44 states have adopted conscience clauses to protect health care providers
from discrimination for refusal to participate in abortions. Durham, Wood & Condie, Accom-
modation of Conscientious Objection to Abortion: A Case Study of the Nursing Profession,
1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 253, 308-09. Illinois, however, is the only state which has extended this
protection to any act "contrary to ... conscientious convictions in refusing to obtain, receive,
accept or deliver medical services and medical care." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1h, para. 5302
(Smith Hurd Supp. 1987).
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rested for possession of a handgun to another facility.93 When Free
could not locate a receiving hospital to accept the patient, she was
instructed to proceed with the transfer "even if removal required for-
cibly putting the patient in a wheelchair and leaving her in the
park." '94 Her attempt to intervene on behalf of the bedridden patient
resulted in her immediate discharge by the hospital's vice president.9"
Free argued that she was wrongfully discharged in contraven-
tion of the Illinois Right of Conscience Act, which prohibits discrim-
ination against health care personnel who act in accordance with the
dictates of their conscience regarding delivery of health care.96 The
court interpreted the Act to apply to moral convictions arising from
sincerely held religious beliefs, as opposed to ethical concerns relat-
ing to Free's duty as a registered nurse. Since Free did not allege
that the acts she was ordered to perform violated traditional religious
beliefs, the court refused to use the Right of Conscience Act to create
a public policy exception to her employer's right to discharge her.
Although the court stated that the ethical concerns expressed
fell into the province of the Illinois Nursing Act,97 it did not address
the alternative of using it as a legislative source of public policy to
protect Free's actions.
Sides v. Duke University,98 a North Carolina case, is unusual in
that a nurse was successful in litigating a wrongful discharge claim
based on a statutory public policy exception to the employment-at-
will rule. Sides was ordered by a physician to administer a drug she
believed would be harmful to her patient. When Sides refused to
administer the medication the physician did so himself, causing the
patient to suffer a cardiac arrest and subsequent brain damage.99
During pretrial discovery in the ensuing lawsuit, Sides was
warned by several hospital physicians and attorneys not to tell all
she had seen of the incident and threatened that she "would be in
trouble" if she did so."' Despite these threats Sides testified truth-
fully and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the patient's estate in
the amount of $1,750,000.'11 Shortly thereafter Sides was terminated
93. Free, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 46-47, 505 N.E.2d at 1189.
94. Id. at 47, 505 N.E.2d at 1189.
95. Id. The hospital discharged Nurse Free in spite of the fact that the patient's physi-
cian was also opposed to the transfer. Id.
96. Id. at 48, 505 N.E.2d at 1189.
97. Id. at 49, 505 N.E.2d at 1190.
98. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985).
99. Id. at 333, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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on the grounds of "an abusive attitude" and poor job performance,
although the hospital refused to disclose specific instances of poor
performance.'"2
The court recognized the importance of public policy limitations
on an employer's right to discharge an employee because "in a civi-
lized state where reciprocal legal rights and duties abound the words
'at will' can never mean 'without limit or qualification.' "13 There-
fore, the court departed from established common law in North Car-
olina by holding that no employer has the right to discharge an em-
ployee without civil liability for refusing to testify untruthfully in a
court case.
Due to the existence of criminal penalties for perjury, the court
stated that to hold otherwise would sanction lawlessness at the ex-
pense of innocent victims."0 The court echoed the dictum of the
New Jersey Court of Appeals in Warthen v. Toms River Commu-
nity Memorial Hospital'0 5 in its insistence on a legislative source of
public policy to create a balance between employers' right to dis-
charge and employees' need for protection from the harshness of the
at-will rule.1 °
Despite the trend toward recognition of the need for public pol-
icy limitations on an employer's absolute right to discharge an em-
ployee,107 the at-will-employee nurse who attempts to challenge ter-
mination of her employment on the basis of public policy, statutory
or otherwise, clearly faces an uncertain fate.
2. Constitutional and Federal Statutory Protection Against
Wrongful Discharge
Nurses able to take advantage of federal laws or constitutional
protection have fared better in suits involving retaliation for patient
advocacy. Jones v. Memorial Hospital System108 involved an inten-
sive care nurse who was discharged for writing a magazine article
concerning conflicts between the duty of hospital personnel to pro-
long life and the right of patients to die with dignity. Jones used a
102. Id. at 334, 328 S.E.2d at 821-22.
103. Id. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
104. Id.
105. 199 N.J. Super. 18, 25, 488 A.2d 229, 232 (1985). See supra note 71 and accom-
panying text.
106. Note, supra note 53, at 850-51.
107. The Sides court noted at length that the doctrine of employment-at-will has come
under increasing criticism as being "unfair and no longer suited to the evolving economic rela-
tions between employer and employee." 74 N.C. App. at 339, 328 S.E.2d at 824.
108. 677 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
1989]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
blend of fictitious and actual cases to express her point of view as a
nurse caught between doctors' orders and patients' wishes. She ar-
gued that her discharge violated her rights under the freedom of
speech clause of the Texas Constitution.1"9
The appellate court reversed the lower court's summary judg-
ment, stating that the ethical and social issues concerning a patient's
right to die were a matter of public concern and therefore the article
was entitled to constitutional protection. The court pointed out that
Jones' "article contributed to the public forum a viewpoint that
might not otherwise be considered." '
The court was careful to distinguish Jones from Maus v. Na-
tional Living Centers,' which also involved the discharge of a
health care provider in retaliation for patient advocacy. The court
affirmed the Maus court's refusal to recognize a public policy excep-
tion to the at-will employment rule. Therefore, the court concluded,
the hospital was entitled to discharge Jones on any grounds that
were not constitutionally protected." 2
Better protection may exist for nurses employed by public hos-
pitals. In Rookard v. Health and Hospitals Corp.,"' Margaret
Rookard was employed as Director of Nurses at Harlem Hospital,
where she supervised a staff of approximately 1000 people. When
Rookard took steps to correct numerous wasteful and illegal practices
she was harassed with anonymous, threatening phone calls and
letters."'
Rookard reported these matters to the Inspector General of the
municipal Health and Hospitals Corporation. One month later she
was demoted. Several months after her demotion, she was offered the
option of termination or an entry-level nursing position. Rookard
challenged the hospital's actions on the grounds that they violated
her first amendment right of free speech regarding matters that were
of public concern.
109. Id. at 224.
110. Id.
111. 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
112. Jones, 677 S.W.2d at 225. Although the appellate court found that the plaintiff
was entitled to constitutional protection, the case was remanded for determination of the hospi-
tal's status as a public entity under the state action doctrine. Id. at 226. "In determining
whether an action complained of constitutes 'state action' . . . [the] court must examine
whether sufficiently close nexus exists between state and challenged action so that the action
may fairly be treated as that of the state itself." BLACK'S LAW DiCTiONARy 1262 (5th ed.
1979).
113. 710 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
114. Id. at 44.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld Rookard's affirmative
duty to act on matters which were her proper concern. The court
stated that Rookard's treatment by Health and Hospitals Corpora-
tion evidenced an official policy that "blowing the whistle would not
be tolerated and would be met with swift retribution."1  The court
held that in view of Rookard's long and distinguished career as a
nursing administrator, the discharge could only be explained as re-
taliatory and reversed the lower court's decision." 6
In Misericordia Hospital Medical Center v. NLRB, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board ordered a hospital to reinstate a head
nurse who had been discharged for reporting inadequate staffing and
unsanitary conditions to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals. " 7 The report was presented by plaintiff at a public infor-
mation interview, in which interested parties were invited to present
relevant information on whether standards were being met. Nine
days later, after fifteen years of satisfactory service, Nurse Cafaro
was fired because "she did not fit in with the . . . goals of Miseri-
cordia Hospital."" 8
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that in the health care
field, issues relating to patient welfare and employee working condi-
tions are often "inextricably intertwined." 9 Therefore, Cafaro's
conduct came within the ambit of the National Labor Relations Act,
which protects employees' right to act collectively for the purpose of
mutual aid or protection. 2 Significantly, the court approved the
NLRB's finding that Cafaro was bound by the American Nurses'
Association Code for Nurses to improve standards of nursing care
and that therefore, "Cafaro's contribution to the Report was 'a step
toward meeting' her professional obligations." 21
In Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hospitals, a black registered
nurse successfully invoked Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
115. Id. at 47.
116. Id. at 46-47.
117. 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980).
118. Id. at 811.
119. Id. at 813.
120. Id. The court also affirmed the NLRB's finding that, as head nurse, Cafaro was
not a statutory supervisor. Her primary responsibility was to maintain "the quality of patient
care in the unit." Id. at 816. Therefore, her supervisorial duties were secondary, affording her
protection under the NLRA.
121. Id. at 814 n.9. The A.N.A. CODE, supra note 13, at 1792, stipulates that when
factors in the health care delivery system threaten the welfare of the patient, "the practice
should . . . be reported to the appropriate authority within the institution, agency, or larger
system."
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to challenge her discharge for individual acts of patient advocacy."' 2
Wrighten complained to her superiors about alleged mistreatment of
black patients and discrimination against black staff members. When
her efforts proved unproductive, Wrighten held a press conference to
protest black patient care at the hospital. Shortly thereafter an all-
white committee was appointed to investigate the matter. Wrighten
was subsequently terminated on the grounds that she did not cooper-
ate with the investigation committee.12
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Wrighten had met her
burden of proving that the hospital retaliated against her for engag-
ing in protected activities.124 The court recognized the difficult posi-
tion of nurses who challenge hospital administrations by stating that
"[p]atient advocacy by a nurse is not insubordination." '125 Thus, her
actions did not exceed statutory protection and Wrighten prevailed
on her claim of retaliatory discharge.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Scope of the Problem
1. Confusion in the Courts
Ethics must be distinguished from morality. Ethics focuses on
the development of rational methods for choosing the best course of
action among conflicting alternatives, whereas "morals refers to 'ac-
tion in accordance to rules of 'right' conduct.' "126 Ethical reasoning
is a process that must be learned systematically in order to be ap-
plied consistently in varying factual situations. This requires formal
education as well as actual experience in defining and resolving ethi-
cal dilemmas. 27
However, while cautioning health professionals against confus-
ing decisions made according to moral precepts with those made ac-
cording to ethical considerations, courts have not provided usable
guidelines to accomplish this task. In Warthen v. Toms River Com-
munity Memorial Hospital, s28 the New Jersey Court of Appeals re-
lied on the state supreme court's dictum in Pierce v. Ortho
122. 726 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982)).
123. Id. at 1350.
124. Id. at 1357.
125. Id.
126. ETHICAL ISSUES IN NURSING, supra note 19, at 210 (citing H. BRODY, ETHICAL
DECISIONS IN MEDICINE 18 (1981)).
127. Huckabay, supra note 8, at 65.
128. 199 N.J. Super. 18, 26, 488 A.2d 229, 233 (1985).
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Pharmaceuticals29 to draw a distinction between the personal moral
beliefs of the health care provider and guidelines promulgated by a
professional code of ethics.
The court's decision that the etiology of the plaintiff's actions
was moral rather than ethical, and therefore did not rise to the level
of public policy, deprived her of a cause of action. More important,
the court's failure to articulate standards by which this distinction is
made fails to provide nurses with guidelines for future conduct, since
Warthen's philosophical objection to continued kidney dialysis ar-
guably fell into the realm of a responsible ethical decision.
The Illinois Court of Appeals in Free v. Holy Cross Hospital
further blurred the distinction between ethical guidelines and moral
beliefs when it defined morally controversial issues subject to protec-
tion under the Right of Conscience Act "as euthanasia, sterilization
or abortion."' 0 By contrast, in Warthen the New Jersey court held
that because plaintiff's moral convictions were for her own benefit,
they did not rise to the level of public policy. Conversely, it implied
that Warthen might have prevailed had she instead argued that her
conduct, which was similar to that of plaintiff Free, was based on
ethical considerations.
Furthermore, the Warthen court erroneously concluded that the
plaintiff's reliance on the American Nurses' Association Code for
Nurses was solely for her own benefit, when it stated that "[b]y re-
fusing to perform the procedure she may have eased her own con-
science, but she neither benefited the society-at-large, the patient, nor
the patient's family."'' On the contrary, "the Code for Nurses is a
policy document that constitutes the expression of principles that are
geared to the enhancement of health care in general," rather than
the personal well-being of individual nurses.' 32
Due in part to conflicts created by the courts' imprecise concep-
tualization, "[t]he value of an ethics code provision in arguing a pub-
lic policy exception in a wrongful discharge action is clearly limited
to a supportive role, helpful in buttressing the public policy argu-
ment but not sufficient to sustain it."' 33
Another barrier to successful use of professional codes of ethics
as a basis for patient advocacy is the widespread insistence by the
129. 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
130. 153 Il1. App. 3d 45, 48, 505 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (1985).
131. Warthen, 199 N.J. Super. at 28-29, 488 A.2d at 234.
132. Blum, The Code of Nurses and Wrongful Discharge, 21 NURSING FORUM 10, 11
(1984).
133. Id. at 12.
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courts that the source of public policy be statutory. This requirement
is largely due to a reluctance to identify and define broad concepts of
public policy, "lest they mistake their own predelictions [sic] for
public policy which deserves recognition at law."' 4
Moreover, "courts do not concur on what constitutes public pol-
icy . . . . [Tihey also disagree on the sources they are willing to use
in applying the exception to the employment-at-will rule."'3 5 Indeed,
the attempt to define public policy may defeat its effectiveness in
protecting some of the more "nebulous societal values that are not
• . .spelled out in a specific . . . statutory provision."'36 Clearly,
the attempts of health professionals to use nonstatutory sources of
public policy, such as professional codes of ethics, demonstrate the
need for specific statutory authority to support acts of patient
advocacy.
2. Institutional Dynamics
Although the importance of nursing advocacy may be formally
acknowledged by health care institutions, it is basically at odds with
the culture of the hospital system. Advocates must, therefore, tread
carefully to avoid being labelled troublemakers.3 Institutional dy-
namics tend to inhibit fellow nurses from supporting a difficult ethi-
cal decision of a colleague. The initial support of a colleague may be
withdrawn in the face of administrative pressure to conform to the
policies of the institution.' 8"
Thus, while it may be more effective to take action collectively,
concerted action is often difficult to organize despite the protection
offered by legislation such as the National Labor Relations Act.
Moreover, few nurses possess the means or desire to engage in pro-
tracted litigation to protect their rights as patient advocates. The end
result is that the patient pays the price for lack of administrative
support for nursing advocacy.
The patient advocate is charged with recognizing the impor-
tance of good working relationships within the health care system.
134. Note, supra note 53, at 847 (quoting Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290,
297, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 163 (1982)).
135. Note, supra note 53, at 845.
136. Id. at 847 (quoting Comment, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet: The Narrow
Public Policy Exception to the Terminable-At-Will Rule, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 565, 587
(1984).
137. Kohnke, supra note 20, at 2040.
138. See generally Smith, Outrageous or Outraged: A Nurse Advocate Story, 1980
NURSING OUTLOOK 624; Smith, supra note 48, at 18.
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However, "occasionally all efforts to negotiate, compromise and per-
suade may be futile and . . . in the interests of protecting the patient
the advocate must be willing to risk alienation of co-workers, em-
ployee/employer relationships, and career in the interests of ethical
and moral convictions."1 9
B. Factors Calling for Change
1. Advances in Medical Technology
Scientific advances in modern medicine have created a situation
of bewildering complexity for the average patient. The health care
team has evolved to deal with the increased scope of medical knowl-
edge. This specialization has, however, led to a fragmentation of
medical care.""0 The nurse is often the only consistent presence in
the patient's hospital environment. Nurses provide sustained and in-
timate care for the patient and are thus able not only to interpret the
baffling array of unfamiliar procedures, but also to understand their
impact on the patient as a unique individual.'"' The nurse is, there-
fore, an ideal patient advocate due to both her sophisticated medical
knowledge and high degree of patient contact." 2 Conversely, the typ-
ical physician's workload allows little opportunity for this level of
interaction with the patient. 43
Technological developments allowing the. artificial prolongation
of life have engendered the need for decisions that were inconceivable
a few years ago. Nurses complain that what can be done for the
patient is asked more frequently than what should be done.'44 This
may cause significant frustration due to the consequences of the tasks
the nurse is ordered to perform. For instance, in Barber v. Superior
Court, although the physicians made the decision to deny intrave-
nous fluids to a comatose patient, the nurses had to care for a patient
dying from acute dehydration.""
139. Robinson, supra note 4, at 59 (citing Zussman, Think Twice About Becoming A
Patient Advocate, NURSINGLIFE 46, 50 (Nov./Dec. 1982)).
140. ETHICAL ISSUES IN NURSING, supra note 19, at 2. The fragmentation of medical
care is especially evident in medical teaching facilities where patients are exposed to a deper-
sonalizing barrage of ever-changing faces and procedures.
141. Theis, Ethical Issues, A Nursing Perspective, 1986 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1222,
1223-24.
142. Note, A Structural Analysis of the Physician-Patient Relationship in No-Code De-
cision-making, 93 YALE L.J. 362, 382 n.116 (1983).
143. Corless, supra note 22, at 72.
144. Lagerlof, Nurses and Ethics, 9 CAL. NURSING REV. 12 (1987).
145. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). See supra note 48 and accom-
panying text.
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Situations such as this arise primarily because of the conflict
between the physician's decision, usually based on sophisticated sci-
entific criteria, and the nurse's decision, usually based on human val-
ues. Tensions arise because physicians often ignore the expertise of
nurses when seeking solutions to ethical dilemmas generated by med-
ical problems."" However, "the nurse offers a philosophically differ-
ent, but legitimate, perspective on patient care. "147
2. Changes Within The Nursing Profession
The women's movement has been a major factor in the current
expansion of the nurse's role.148 One author describes a virtual
"revolution" since the late 1970's in nurses' self-image and willing-
ness to make independent decisions." 9 The result of this change is a
reluctance to subordinate the patient's needs to those of the doctor
and the hospital.
In 1981, a major nursing journal conducted a study of 12,500
nurses based on Tuma v. Board of Nursing, in which a nurse was
sanctioned for discussing treatment alternatives at the request of her
patient. 6 An overwhelming eighty-three percent of nurses partici-
pating in the study supported Tuma's decision to act in what she
judged to be the best interests of her patient."' The approval of
Tuma's actions was consistent despite differences in age, sex and
educational level.'
5 2
The nurses in the study articulated their duty as patient advo-
cates. They reasoned that this duty, in combination with the pa-
tient's right to know, 5 ' made Tuma's actions necessary and proper.
Evidently, a large number of modern nurses are willing to accept the
duty of patient advocacy.
Since the early 1970's, modern nurse practice acts have rede-
fined nursing as an independent profession with a unique body of
146. Murphy, The Changing Role of Nurses in Making Ethical Decisions, 12 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 173, 175 (1984).
147. Id.
148. Bullough, supra note 32, at 379.
149. Murphy, supra note 146, at 174.
150. Sandroff, supra note 22, at 28 (citing Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74,
593 P.2d 711 (1979)).
151. Sandroff, supra note 22, at 30.
152. Sandroff, supra note 22, at 30.
153. BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 1782 states "[tihe patient has the right to
obtain from his physician complete current information concerning his diagnosis, treatment
and prognosis in terms the patient can be reasonably expected to understand."
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knowledge distinct from medicine.""' While medicine focuses on
pathologic function in illness, "the focus of nursing [is] the patient's
response to the health problem and the nursing needs which arise
from such responses." 165 "Within the realm of human responses to
the health problems which nurses diagnose and treat, lie many qual-
ity-of-life issues."1 '
However, the ethical mandate of a nurse may conflict with that
of a physician because of these differing perspectives. "The number
of . . .conflicts is increasing between the two professions, especially
in the teaching hospital where acute care medicine is practiced." '57
As nurses become more willing to speak out on ethical issues, "litiga-
tion may result unless nurses are intimately involved in patient care
and institutional decision making." 5 8
3. The Chronic Nursing Shortage
The frustration of responsibility for patient welfare in the ab-
sence of authority to make decisions has contributed to the chronic
nursing shortage." Nurses' desire to participate in health care deci-
sions regarding their patients has been partly responsible for the well
documented phenomenon of "burnout" in the profession. 6°
154. Bullough, supra note 32, at 383;, Murphy, supra note 146, at 174.
155. Murphy, supra note 146, at 174.
156. Murphy, supra note 146, at 175.
157. Murphy, supra note 146, at 175.
158. Murphy, supra note 146, at 175. Although whistleblowing statutes afford some
protection to nurses who publicly voice their concerns, the better solution is to provide nurses
with a stronger voice in the health care community to avoid outcomes such as litigation. See,
e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(11)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989), which provides that
"[ainy person ... who reports or provides information to the board in good faith, and without
malice shall not be subject to an action for civil damages or other relief as the result of such
report."
159. Congress has studied the dimensions of this [nursing] shortage, as have hos-
pital administrators and nurses. The Nurse Training Act of 1975 gave the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services authority to make grants to public and
non-profit private nursing schools to help increase the supply of nurses. Even
with these grants . . . there is mounting evidence to document the existence of a
nursing shortage in all types of patient care settings.
Comment, supra note 49, at 118-19.
According to a 1980 study of member hospitals by the American Hospital Association,
"there are between 90,000 and 100,000 vacant positions for nurses, with nursing vacancies in
eighty percent of the nation's hospitals. In California, the number of full-time vacancies is over
twenty percent with a turnover rate exceeding fifty percent." Comment, supra note 49, at 119.
Ominously, "the number of vacant budgeted registered nurse positions nationally more than
doubled between 1985 and 1986." Westfall, supra note 3, at 18.
160. The term "burnout" refers to the frustration nurses experience as a result of "their
lack of a sense of selfworth ...and their perception of poor professional interactions with
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Studies done by the American Hospital Association in response
to the severe nursing shortage of the late 1970's and early 1980's
found that "nurses left the profession most frequently because of
their inability to participate in the clinical decision making process
in a meaningful way."' 1
The serious shortage of working nurses has led to widespread
understaffing in hospitals,"'a the effects of which "range from reduc-
ing the quality of care to actually jeopardizing patient safety." 's
Nurses have been held accountable for their failure to meet profes-
sional standards, even when working under unreasonable staffing
conditions due to administrative decisions over which they had no
control. 6" A vicious cycle results as more nurses become dissatisfied
because of their inability to meet legal and professional standards
due to inadequate staffing.
C. Barriers to Role Expansion
Health care institutions typically fail to provide an atmosphere
in which nurses are encouraged to participate in decisions regarding
their patients.' 65 However, ethical decision-making requires the abil-
ity to arrive at conclusions that are not the mere result of moral
intuition. Therefore, nurses' lack of input into ethical decisions de-
nies them the benefit of the experience necessary to the learning
process.' 66
In addition, "notions of ethics committees and shared health
care decision making challenge the tradition of physicians as lone
decision-makers."' 67 The confusion between the nature of medical
physicians." Murphy, supra note 146, at 174.
161. Murphy, supra note 146, at 174.
162. The nursing shortage has had a direct impact on the ability of hospitals to care for
the sick. "Fourteen percent of hospitals in large urban areas and 9 percent in small urban
areas are delaying admissions because of the shortage." Will, The Dignity of Nursing, NEWS-
WEEK, May 23, 1988, at 80. "In November 1987, one small northern California hospital
closed its doors, citing three reasons, one of which was the lack of sufficient nurses." Westfall,
supra note 3, at 20.
163. Comment, supra note 49, at 120.
164. For instance, in the case of In re Hagans, the California Board of Registered
Nurses revoked the license of a registered nurse for delegating responsibility to unlicensed
personnel for instilling routine opthalmic medication in the eyes of newborns, in spite of the
Board's finding that the department was badly understaffed and no injury had occurred.
Westfall, supra note 3, at 31 (citing In re Hagans, BRN No. 79-14 (Cal. 1980)). See also
Comment, supra note 49, at 125-26; Cushing, Staffing: Sometimes A No-Win Situation, 1986
AM. J. OF NURSING 389.
165. Murphy, supra note 146, at 174.
166. Huckabay, supra note 8, at 64; Theis, supra note 144, at 1224.
167. Murphy, supra note 146, at 173.
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decisions and health care decisions contributes to physicians' reluc-
tance to relinquish decision making power. Medical decisions are
based on the doctor's special knowledge and clinical expertise.
Problems arise because many physicians also claim the exclusive
right to make health care decisions that deal with social values and
which are thus nonmedical in nature.168
Lack of time is a significant factor inhibiting the patient advo-
cacy process. Aside from the obvious time constraints presented by
emergency situations, heavy caseloads and the emphasis placed on
task performance severely limit nurses' ability to reflect on issues
with which they are confronted. Hospital administrators have a duty
to provide opportunities for nurses to analyze and resolve ethical di-
lemmas.' 9 However, the current trend toward cost containment is
unlikely to allow staffing patterns that provide adequate opportuni-
ties for such philosophical introspection.'" 0
There are other problems inherent in the role of the nurse as
patient advocate. The legal definition of advocate implies that some-
one has selected an individual to serve that function. 7' However,
under normal circumstances a patient cannot decide whether the
nurse will act as his or her advocate. Therefore, the nurse may have
to decide whether to function as protector of the best interests of the
patient against the patient's own wishes.
Thus, there may be a conflict between the dual duties of pro-
tecting the patient and representing his or her best interests."' Be-
cause of this potential conflict, advocacy may be psychologically very
difficult for health care professionals. They tend to fall into the trap
caused by the "rescuer complex," in which they assume they know
what is best for the patient. 7 Such paternalism, however, is con-
trary to the patient advocate's fundamental duty to respect the pa-
tient's decisions, despite the nurse's own personal convictions. This
conflict may, therefore, result in the need for intervention by an ad-
vocate between patient and nurse.
This raises the ultimate issue of whether the role of patient ad-
vocate should be assumed by nurses at all. "A patient's fear and
pain, as well as forced dependency, exposure, and physical contact
can make it extremely difficult for the nurse (who is usually a total
168. Huckabay, supra note 8, at 62.
169. ETHICAL ISSUES IN NURSING, supra note 19, at 77-78.
170. L. CURTIN & M. FLAHERTY, supra note 5, at 164-65.
171. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (5th ed. 1979).
172. Abrams, supra note 21, at 264-65.
173. Kohnke, supra note 20, at 2039.
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stranger) to understand or appreciate the individual, not as a patient
but as a person. 174
In addition, as long as a nurse is dependent on the good will of
her employer, there may be conflicts if she attempts to advocate a
position of which the institution disapproves. In order to be effective,
a patient advocate may need to be financially independent of the hos-
pital. This would have the advantage of giving patients flexibility to
change advocates at will, as well as ensuring primary accountability
to the patient.'75 This concept of patient advocacy would, however,
inevitably limit nurses to a task oriented role that would be unac-
ceptable to a majority of modern nurses. 176
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Implementation of Patient Advocacy
The Ethics Committee of the California Nurses' Association ad-
vises nurses to avoid the common pitfall of self-righteousness and to
attempt a collaborative rather than adversarial approach.177 The first
step is to ascertain the patient's true preferences. Imposition of the
nurse's own values on the patient must be scrupulously avoided to
ensure that the decisions reached are consistent with the patient's
beliefs.'
78
The nurse also has a duty to understand the legal ramifications
of the situation, as well as the bioethical principles to be applied.
Once this is established, the nurse should arrange a meeting with the
patient's physicians to express her concerns. A face-to-face encounter
is recommended.179
If the foregoing techniques are ineffective, the nurse is urged to
persist in attempting to resolve the problem. Nursing colleagues, su-
pervisory personnel and ethics committees should be enlisted.' If
the situation is still uncorrected, the American Nurses' Association
recommends reporting to authorities such as practice committees of
174. Abrams, supra note 21, at 263.
175. Abrams, supra note 21, at 265-66.
176. One nursing theorist writes, "Nursing can and should be distinguished by its phi-
losophy of care and not by its care functions." ETHICAL ISSUES IN NURSING, supra note 19, at
12. See also supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
177. Desmarais, Ethical Advocacy with Style, CAL. NURSE 7 (July/Aug. 1986).
178. As one nurse educator states, "Whatever patients define as their goal, it is their
meaning and not ours, their values and not ours, and their living or dying and not ours."
ETHICAL ISSUES IN NURSING, supra note 19, at 17.
179. Desmarais, supra note 177, at 7. According to one nursing commentator, "[A] wise
word, well dropped, can make people retreat." Kohnke, supra note 20, at 2040.
180. Desmarais, supra note 177, at 7.
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professional organizations and appropriate licensing bodies."' 1
B. Legislative Measures
Case law demonstrates that nursing advocacy must be specifi-
cally recognized and supported by statute. Until there is legislative
acknowledgement of the nurse's need for protection in her role as
patient advocate "the nurse continues to risk her career and her li-
cense as she pursues the ethical mandate of advocacy."' 82
Amendment of existing nurse practice acts is preferable to en-
actment of freestanding statutes. Amendment of current laws gov-
erning the professional conduct of nurses will decrease the potential
for misapplication, as well as provide the clear mandate of public
policy required by the courts.
A widely acknowledged code of ethics, such as the American
Nurses' Association Code for Nurses, should be used to clarify the
basis for distinguishing between moral and ethical decisions. This
requirement is essential, since the courts must be able to apply con-
sistent guidelines to equitably determine the conduct to be protected
by ethical decision-making legislation, as opposed to more general
laws directed at protecting rights of conscience.
Language such as the following, prohibiting penalizing nurses
who make responsible ethical decisions regarding patient care,
should be incorporated into each state nurse practice act.
Each nurse has a duty to protect the ethical and legal rights of
all patients. Each patient has the right to determine what will
be done with his or her person; to be given information neces-
sary for making informed judgments; to be told the possible ef-
fects of care; and to accept, refuse, or terminate treatment.
These rights apply to minors and others not legally qualified
and must be respected to the fullest degree.
The nurse shall fulfill this obligation by working with the
patient and others to arrive at the best decisions dictated by the
circumstances, the patient's rights and wishes, and the highest
standards of care. The imposition of the nurse's personal moral
or religious values on the patient shall be scrupulously avoided
to ensure that the decisions reached are consistent with the pa-
tient's individual beliefs.
The nurse shall not be penalized for such reasonable good
181. A.N.A. CODE, supra note 13, at 1792.
182. Robinson, supra note 4, at 62.
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faith acts of patient advocacy.183
C. Judicial Measures
The duty of patient advocacy should be supported through pen-
alties for those who breach, or cause others to breach, this responsi-
bility. A cause of action for wrongful discharge should be recognized
against those who willfully prevent or punish acts of advocacy in
violation of the mandate of the particular state nurse practice act.
Judicial recognition that the ultimate beneficiary of nursing advocacy
is not the nurse, but the patient, will further the important, public
policy underlying the patient's right to self-determination.
D. Collective Bargaining Measures
Every hospital stands to benefit from an ethics committee on
which nurses are represented. Such representation is important since
the nurse, as the provider of total patient care, has a valuable contri-
bution to make in weighing the burdens and benefits of a plan of
treatment. Recognition of the duty of patient advocacy must be sup-
ported by the collective bargaining unit of which the nurse is a mem-
ber. It is uncommon at present for collective bargaining agreements
to provide for nurses' rights to participate in ethical decisions.18
In order to be effective, this right must be enforced by provi-
sions for a structured dialogue between the nurse and the hospital
administration when problems develop. This can be accomplished ei-
ther by setting up a formal grievance procedure, requiring the matter
to be submitted to an ethics committee, or by arbitration. If an ethics
committee exists, the collective bargaining unit should negotiate for
strong representation on it by nurses.
E. Educational Measures
The importance of informed ethical decisions should be sup-
ported by continuing education for working nurses. California, for
183. Adapted from A.N.A CODE, supra note 13, at 1.1, 1.6.
184. Many collective bargaining agreements set up professional performance committees
to make recommendations to administration regarding nursing practice. They may also address
the right of nurses not to participate in abortions. However, generally there is no specific
language supporting the right of nurses to participate in making ethical decisions. See, e.g.,
Agreement between Stanford University Hospital and the Committee for Recognition of Nurs-
ing Achievement, 1986-1988; Memorandum of Understanding between the Registered Nurses
Professional Association and the County of Santa Clara, 1986-1988; Memorandum of Under-
standing between El Camino Hospital and Professional Resource for Nurses, 1984-1986.
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example, requires that nurses obtain at least thirty hours of continu-
ing education every two years in order to qualify for relicensure1 85
Due to the trend toward expansion of the nursing role, nurses of-
fered the opportunity will undoubtedly be eager to learn methods of
implementing patient advocacy. Providers of continuing education
will realize the economic potential of developing courses in response
to a legislatively defined mandate for ethical advocacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Medical technological progress continues to create increasingly
complex ethical problems. A sophisticated level of awareness is
needed to develop constructive solutions. Because of her high degree
of patient contact and medical knowledge, the nurse stands out as the
health care professional most suited to the role of patient advocate.
Nurses, with their emphasis on human values, are in an ideal posi-
tion to contribute to controversial treatment decisions and evaluate
their impact on individual patients.
Nurses welcome the responsibility and accountability concomi-
tant with the status of nursing as an independent profession. They
have expressed their dissatisfaction with the reluctance of physicians
and institutions to allow their input into decisions regarding their
patients by leaving the profession. This has created a widespread
severe shortage of nurses, often to the detriment of the patient
population.
Legislative, judicial and administrative support for ethical deci-
sion-making will benefit both the nursing profession and the pa-
tients, who are the consumers of nursing care. In addition, physi-
cians and health care institutions stand to gain much from the
insight that nurses bring to the delivery of total patient care.
Karen Markus
185. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2811.5 (West Supp. 1989).
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